Ten Weird Things We Learned From Klaas J. Kraay

If Ronald Majthenyi books conference space at the underwhelming DaVinci Office Centre and flies in Ryerson-based theologian Klaas J. Kraay to argue that multiverse-travel requires no abdication of faith, could in fact even buttress said faith, then avail yourself of the DaVinci Office Centre’s praline and caramel frozen chocolate sticks and hear what Kraay has to say.

One: If Klaas J. Kraay opens with Bernard Carr’s oft-quoted,

“If you don’t want God then you better have a multiverse, ” recognize that Kraay, merely Ryerson-affiliated after all, is setting Carr up as the scientific strawman who fears the “G-word” more than any Satanic Meetup virgin ever could.

Two: Struggle to maintain focus as Kraay drones introductorily from his paper, The Theistic Multiverse: Problems and Prospects:

“Once considered outré or absurd, multiple universe theories appear to be gaining considerable scientific respectability. There are, of course, many such theories, including Everett’s (1957) many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, defended by Deutsch (1997) and others; Linde’s (1986) eternal inflation view, which suggests that universes form like bubbles in a chaotically inflating sea; Smolin’s (1997) fecund universe theory, which proposes that universes are generated through black holes; the cyclic model, recently defended using string/M theory by Steinhardt and Turok (2007), which holds that distinct universes are formed in a never-ending sequence of Big Bangs and Big Crunches; and Tegmark’s (2007) “Level IV” multiverse, which contains many universes governed by distinct mathematical and scientific laws. ” and then, clearing his throat, looking a bit worried for his personal safety, “And today I’d like to introduce the nascent and still-theoretical Majthenyian view, demonstrable, I’ve been assured, at the conclusion of these slides. ”

Three: If you interject, “A fecund view wherein Catherine’s head remains intact? Where our love is omnibenevolently tilled?” Ron will respond, “Better than intact, better than tilled! Please allow Klaas to continue, ” then Klaas will continue: I have said that God will include ‘all and only those universes worth creating and sustaining’ (Kraay 2010.) Others offer more detail. Turner (2003) suggests “a favourable balance of good over evil” and Monton offers various construals of what this might mean. But such a threshold is too simplistic: a universe might meet this condition, while nevertheless containing some feature that makes it unworthy of inclusion in a divinely furnished multiverse. Perhaps sensing this, some philosophers have proposed additional requirements. Parfit says there should be no injustice and that each individuals’ life must be worth living. Forrest first says that every individual must have a life in which good outweighs evil, and later adds two further restrictions: each creature who suffers must at least virtually consent to it, and must receive ample recompense afterwards. Draper says that no individual’s life may be bad overall, and that God must be a benefactor to all creatures. 88

Four: If fraudulent intellectually as you are emotionally, such that Emily was always required to track down your primary sources and absent emotions alike, don’t even consider all the footnotes in Kraay’s paper. Think only of Catherine as you mouth the words, “Construals. Parfit. It all seems so obvious now. ”

Five: With a Mephistophelean raise of the brow, Majthenyi, sipping methacrolein from his goblet, will gesture at the conference centre’s dismal milieu, “All this is merely the fourth station of your personal cross, one you needn’t consent to, due as you’re due the ‘ample recompense’ dear Klaas speaks of. ” 88 (Kraay, The Theistic Multiverse: Problems and Prospects, 2012)

Six: Even as a sempiternalist who hath restored faith to the masses, Pascal’s wager for the fat pot of undoing what you never consented to, e.g. ‘the beheading of Catherine, ’ e.g. ‘the absence of Catherine from your sad life. ’

Seven: Think of her sweaters. The shimmering in the sauna. How very fresh and clean it could feel. Think of the ride home from the drive-in. Think of the six-thousand-ninehundred-and-one lonely nights since. Suggest to Kraay, “Was it not Huw Price who claimed that a time symmetric ontology for quantum theory must necessarily be retrocausal?”

Eight: Request Klaas J. Kraay skip his last few slides to further elucidate the fecundity of possible worlds.

Nine: Take the elevator to the DaVinci building’s roof. Board the helicopter Majthenyi has on standby. Board a plane at the San Francisco International Airport. Fly to Geneva, Switzerland. Get a decent night’s rest. Flail in that binary being/non-being undertow between sleep and dreams. Consult Catherine cleavage pictures on your phone. Wonder just what Price you wouldn’t pay. Masturbate to the pseudonecromantic possibilities yielded by the eternal inflation of the multiverse.

Ten: Meet Klaas J. Kraay for a morning muffin at the Grand Hôtel Kempinski’s continental breakfast station. Exchange hackneyed-and-all-too revelatory Celestine Prophecy -type dialog with Klaas J. Kraay not worthy of inclusion in this blog. Reminisce about your own days at Ryerson. Express your desire to have matriculated elsewhere. Board the shuttle. Show your day pass and visit the Large Hadron Collider at CERN.